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Abstract 
Diese  Diplomarbeit  beschäftigt  sich  mit  den  historischen  und  ideologischen  Grundsätzen  der  
Rhetorik  der  kemalistischen  Frauen,  welche  die  sogenannten  „republikanischen  Proteste“  des  
Jahres   2007   organisierten   und   durchführten   um   gegen   die   Präsidentschaftskandidaten   der  
gegenwärtigen   Regierung   aufgrund   ihrer   kopftuchtragenden Frauen vorzugehen. Diese 
Proteste   wurden   von   kemalistischen   Frauen   getragen,   deren   Identität   als   ideale  
republikanische   Frau   im   Zuge   des  Modernisierungsprojektes   der   1920er   Jahre   von  Atatürk  
und   seinen  Anhängern   konstruiert  wurde.   Diese   Identität  mit   der   dazugehörenden  Rhetorik  
basieren auf Laizismus und Nationalismus wie auch die kemalistische Ideologie selber, 
welche  Staatsgründer  und  Armee  als  einzigen  Beschützer  und  Befreier  vorsieht.  Das  Privileg  
als  einziger  Repräsentant  der  türkischen  Frau  gelten zu  dürfen  wurde  durch  die  kemalistische  
Indoktrination bis in die 1990er Jahre nicht in Frage gestellt. Kemalistische Frauen –oder: 
ideale republikanische Frauen- begannen in dieser Zeit sich gegen den Aufstieg des 
politischen Islams zu mobilisieren und definierten   sich   als   türkisch   und   unverschleiert,  
wodurch  ein  großer  Teil  der  Gesellschaft  ausgeschlossen  wurde.  Als  Kern  ihrer  Forderungen  
galt  die  Ablehnung  von  verschleierten  Frauen  an  Universitäten,  im  Parlament  und  schließlich  
auch  als  Ehefrau  des  Präsidenten.  Das  Kopftuch  wurde  als  Bedrohung  der  „republikanischen  
Werte“  betrachtet.  Während  der  Proteste   erklärten   sie:   „Wir   sind  hier  um  die  Republik  und  
ihre   Werte   zu   verteidigen“.   Eine   First   Lady   mit   Kopftuch   wäre   ein   Verstoß   gegen   den  
säkularen   Staat   und   seine   Prinzipien   und   sie   würden   das   nicht   akzeptieren.   Außerdem  
erklärten   sie,   dass   die   gegenwärtige   Regierung   eine   geheime   Agenda   zur   Ersetzung   des  
türkischen   Rechtsstaates   durch   einen   islamistischen   Gottesstaat   verfolge.   Darüber   hinaus  
betrieben sie eine Rhetorik, welche Frauen von kopftuchtragenden Frauen entfremdete und 
eine   größere   Spaltung   in  modern/vormodern,   Industrie/Rückständigkeit,  Kemalismus/   Islam    
und West und Ost inkludierte. Damit schufen sie zwei unterschiedliche Wertesysteme, von 
 
3 
 
welchen der Kemalismus als das anzustrebende Ideal galt. Die vorliegende Arbeit versucht die 
Wurzeln dieser Idealisierung aufzudecken um den abwertenden Blick der kemalistischen 
Frauen auf die frommen Frauen zu beleuchten.   
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Abstract  
This thesis focuses on the historical and ideological foundations of the rhetoric of Kemalist 
women, who organized and attended the so-called  “Republican  Protests”  in  2007  against  the  
presidential candidates of the current government; due to their covered wives. The protests 
were conducted and led by Kemalist woman, whose identity was constructed as the ideal 
Republican woman within  the  modernization  project  in  1920s  by  Atatürk  and  his  colleagues.  
This identity and its rhetoric rest upon laicism and nationalism likewise the Kemalist ideology 
itself, which sees the army and the founders of the state as the protector and the only 
emancipator. Their privilege as being the only representative of Turkish woman had not 
challenged due to Kemalist indoctrination until the 1990s. Kemalist women -or ideal 
republican women- started their mobilization against the rise of Political Islam in 1990s and 
defined themselves as Turkish and uncovered, which again excluded a big part of society. As 
the core of their rhetoric, they didn’t  want  women with headscarf at the universities, in the 
parliament   and   finally   as   the   president’s   wife. Their headscarf was perceived as a threat 
against   the  “Republican  Values”.    During   the  “Republican  Protests”   they  declared; “We  are  
here to protect our Republic  and  its  values”.  Kemalist  women  claimed  that  a  First  Lady  with  
headscarf would be a violation of the secular state principle and they would not accept that. 
Moreover they stated that the current government had a secret agenda about replacing the 
Turkish constitutional state with an Islamist state. Furthermore the rhetoric, which alienates 
women from women with headscarf, includes a bigger separation, such as modern/pre-
modern, industrial/backwardness, Kemalism/Islam and in final case the West and the East. By 
so doing, their rhetoric creates two different value systems, in which the Kemalist one is 
considered   to  be   the  “ideal”.  This   thesis   tries   to   track down the roots of this idealization to 
illuminate the pejorative view of Kemalist women on pious women. 
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Preface 
 
This thesis studies the rhetoric of the Kemalist women, which lastly appeared in the 
“Republican   Protests”   against   the   candidacy   of   the   Prime   Minister   Tayyip   Erdogan   and  
Abdullah  Gül   for   the  presidential   elections   in  2007. The demonstrations were organized by 
non-governmental organizations and attended predominantly by Kemalist women who 
interpreted  Erdoğan's  and  Gül's  wives'  Islamic  clothing  as  the  violation  of  the  principle  of  the  
secular state. The principle of the secular state in Turkey refers not only to the separation of 
religion and state, but also to a vast state control over religion through various state 
institutions. In this political context head covering has a unique meaning and the statist 
ideology-which claims to be the best interests of the people despite the people- aimed 
confining religion to the private realm. Covering the hair was prohibited in public offices and 
educational institutions. The official ideology, which was established by the Kemalists, 
claimed that it represents and propagates a religious ideology perceived to be hostile to the 
secular foundations of the republic. Accordingly, covering the head became an act of protest 
against the state and its dominant ideology. Arat (1999) wrote that the struggle of Kemalist 
women with the headscarf started in 1990s, and described the case as the transformation of 
Kemalist women to Kemalist feminists, who were mobilized in response to what they 
perceived as the Islamist threat. They were afraid that the Islamic Law would delegitimize or 
replace, the secular legal basis of the republic including the Civil Code. They organized to 
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defend the secular republican framework. In 2007 they made series of demonstrations, which 
took place in the big cities and they were the most well-attended ones in the history of the 
Republic. The demonstrators  were   carrying   flags   and  Atatürk   posters   as   they   claimed   they  
protected and defended “values  of  the  republic”.  The  Organization  Committee  of  the  Protests  
consisted of seven women, who were members of various Kemalist Thought Organizations 
and supporters  of   the  CHP  (Republican  People’s  Party)  which  was  built  by  Atatürk  and  has  
never received the majority of the votes except during monoparty period. Although Kemalist 
women started their political activism in the 1990s, when the pro-Islamist party RP (Welfare 
Party) became powerful in the political arena, the roots of their ideology are embedded in the 
early republican years. The contemporary polarization was settled in the nation-building 
process and its reaction started with 1980s. Its historical roots in the early republican years 
must be examined to understand the discourse of the Kemalist women at these 
demonstrations. This thesis aims at conducting research on the protestors through their 
rhetoric, to clarify who they are, how they are constructed, what they demand, why they see 
pious women as threat and why they stress on nationalism and laicism as the guarantee of 
their freedom.  
The Method 
The method of this research is tracing the historical developments and by conducting a  
literature review of the scholars. The speeches and the symbols of the demonstrations are 
taken from various newspapers and websites. Their accountability is supported by the writer 
of this thesis since she herself witnessed this big event in her home city Istanbul with an 
attempt  to  see  through  the  objective  glasses  of  an  “academic”.   
Plan of the Thesis 
This thesis is divided mainly into two chapters. The first chapter is devoted to the ideological 
background while the second one follows the historical foundations. In the first chapter the 
 
9 
 
representative cases since the 1990s are introduced to exhibit the strong emphasis on  two 
main principles of Kemalism; laicism and nationalism in the rhetoric. In the same chapter , the 
parties and the Turkish political actors are manifested too. Also some pictures are put to show 
the women participants of the protest with their flags and posters. In the second chapter, the 
modernization project is examined to see the historical roots of  the contemporary rhetoric. 
The thesis ends with a conclusion, which tries to combine the two chapters to clarify the 
division within the society.  
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                                                                                 She always had the feeling that it was          
                                                                               very, very dangerous to live even one day. 
       
                                                                                        (V. Woolf, Mrs. Dalloway)                                                 
 
Introduction 
The Ottoman Empire was majorly occupied by the Allies after its defeat in World War I, 
which was considered as the end of the Empire. A group of young military officers, led 
by Mustafa   Kemal   (Atatürk)  and his colleagues, organized a resistance and succeeded. In 
1923,  they  established  the  modern  Republic  of  Turkey  under  the  presidency  of  Atatürk.  The  
new Republic constructed itself as laicist, secular, unitarian and constitutional. The parliament 
with the single party started a series of reforms while they centralized the power, and 
abolished the opposition. The modernization project was executed by the state elites, who 
were soldiers and civil   movements   weren’t   really   allowed. The people were asked to be 
graceful and loving towards the state  and  this  became  the  prerequisite  to  be  a  ‘good’  citizen  in  
the long run. The justification of the practises were always based on the victory gained at the 
Independence War and the emancipators remained ready to accuse anybody of being a traitor 
as soon as any critic appeared towards the ongoing reforms. They needed loyal citizens and 
signifiers for the new state. Women of the Republic played the main role in this nation-
building process as several scholars pointed out. They were not only mothers, who would 
raise   “modern”   citizens  but   also   the  members   of   this   society  who  would   have   the   rights   to  
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attend  and protect the public sphere. The Independence War never remained as a military 
struggle in the official history. Simultaneously it entailed independence, democracy, 
secularism and freedom for women. Women were asked to defend nationalism, which 
includes militarism,   laicism   and   feminism   to   remain   ‘emancipated’. Kemalism addressed 
mainly to educated middle and upper-middle class women. Some of these women were 
already in Ottoman feminist movements and claimed their rights but unfortunately these 
women were erased from the history due to their civil encourage. In official history;  ‘Atatürk  
gave  women   their   rights   althought   no  women   asked   for’.   Tekeli   (1986)   defines it as State 
Feminism. State feminism is a hegemonic and statist ideology, which shapes the movement 
according   to   its   own   limits.   State’s      role   as   protector  makes women faithful and obedient.  
These women became the flags of the Kemalist project, which strived for a radical rupture 
from Ottoman Empire. It started an indoctrinization through the education system. History 
books, especially those on the history of the revolution and the history of the Republic, which 
are used in middle and high-school education, say  “Women were granted their rights by the 
Republican   Regime   without   having   fought   for   these   rights   themselves”.   As   Cakir   (2007)  
articulates   correctly   ‘praising   Kemalist   reforms,   this   androcentric   discourse   designated  
Ataturk as the sole emancipator  of  Turkish  women’.  They  ignored  the   luculent  continuation  
and considered all  the  things  related  to  Ottoman  as  backwardness.  Kadıoğlu  (1994)  describes  
this attitude as Kemalist Orientalism. In her words: The Kemalists, in fact, were influenced by 
what Edward Said calls Orientalism, the manufactured Western image of the Muslim world. 
This image is epitomized in the secluded, veiled, and hence oppressed women of the Muslim 
world. The founders desired to transform the social life in Turkey rapidly. The history of 
politics as well as women in Turkey can not be comprehensible unless this intense 
modernization project; its actors and opposers are well defined in their historical context.  The 
terminological dichotomy of modernism such as modern/traditional, 
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progressive/backwardness, secularist/islamist are often used expressions among Turkish 
society. As a natural consequence of this dichotomy, the society seems divided rather than 
united and this division can be observed among women groups easily since in both ideologies 
women are signifiers through their covered or uncovered hair. However this goes far beyond 
the body politics, due to the women, who are more than signifiers but active actors of the 
politics.The   terms   ''Kemalists”   and   “Republican   modernists”   in   this   work   are   used  
interchangeably to refer to the political elite who initiated a series of reforms to westernize 
Turkey after the Republic was establised in 1923. Mustafa Kemal presided over the counrty 
from 1923 to 1938 and led the reforms. The opposition against him was from those who were 
in favor of keeping the Ottoman, Muslim and traditional elements of the previous regime, but 
the Kemalists maintained control over these groups. The Islamists, who were in favor of 
traditional customs and religious practises, were one of the strongest oppositions. They were 
seen as the internal enemies of the secular state and they were taught how to practise their 
beliefs by the state elites. Religion was prisoned to the private life and public sphere was 
fulled with  “modern”  “republican”  images.  Big  cities  were  adaptive,  while  the  big  part  of the 
country remained indifferent to the reforms. Turkish experience with liberal representative 
democracy began with the 1950 elections, when the ruling elite of the single-party era (1923-
1950) devolved power to the opposition. Since then, there have been three military 
interventions lasting from one to three years, 1960, 1971 and 1980. Despire the interventions, 
representative democracy with its minimum requirements for regular elections, general 
suffrage, secret ballot, free competition of political parties and accountability of the elected 
grew in a unique Muslim context. The Turkish context of democracy was unique because of 
its predominantly Muslim culture with a strong state tradition (Heper, 1985).  
Nevertheless, on the contrary of this homogeneous state idea, the society was divided into 
center and periphery until the 1980s.  “The   center”   and   “the   periphery”   didn’t   really  meet  
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with each other except some kind of insurgency or bureaucratical duties in the East. After the 
1980s, the periphery started showing up in the center phsically and mentally. Intense 
immigration  to  the  big  cities  changed  the  image  of  the  homogenius  “republican”  identity.  The  
conflict  between unveiled enlighted urban and veiled pious peasant evolved into veiled urban 
and unveiled urban. Veiled urban created a big confusion among Kemalist women, who used 
to   think   if  one   is  educated,  she  wouldn’t   cover  her  hair.  This  confusion   led   to  a   fear  which  
was established in the 1920s against having the Sheria Law again. Due to the fear against  
Sheria Law, Turkey has a long-lasting tradition in banning political parties when they are not 
'appropriate' for the Kemalist order, which can de defined as the secular state surrounded by 
the Ataturk reforms. The Constitutional Court used to work as the bodyguard of this system 
and it was strongly supported by the military and the Kemalist groups. All the institutions 
gave a red alarm when the Islamist party enjoyed the majority of the votes at the elections in 
1994. The role of the military in political sphere was the biggest problem that democracy had 
been facing in Turkey untill the AKP government started taking it's decisions to diminish the 
power of the military systematically untill some time ago. Almost all political parties with 
Islamist tendencies have been closed down by the Constitutional Court for violating the 
Republican principle of secularism. Due to the suppression of the Islamists by the state 
institutions this part of the society remained out of the center. They were surely elected as 
representatives, but could never use their own rhetoric. Whenever they dared to do, either the 
party was closed down or military intervened the politics. Three coups in the last 50 years - in 
1960, 1971 and 1980 were carried out by the army and in 1997 it intervened to force Turkey's 
first Islamist Prime Minister, Necmettin Erbakan, from power. Secularists and Islamists 
created two different value systems (consistent cultural values) within the society. The climax 
of the struggle was the AKP victory in the parliamentarian elections. Current prime minister 
Tayyip Erdogan and his party AKP have a strong Islamist background and as well as the 
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majority in the parliament. The prime minister Tayyip Erdogan tried to convince and calm 
down the Kemalism supporter. However it got even worse when the presidential elections 
came up in 2007. When it was time for the presidential elections in 2007, the Kemalist 
population    leading  by  their    NGOs  wanted  to  block  AKP’s  candidate  by  demanding  an  early  
election for parliamentary, so that the new parliamentary would elect the new president. They 
started demonstrations on the streets against the candidate of AKP, who is the current 
president Abdullah   Gül   by   saying   that   his   wife   was   covered   and   that   would   damage the 
secular state principle of the constitution. The demonstrations were made in series and they 
were   radically   attended   by   women,   who   carried   state   symbols   such   as   flags   and   Atatürk  
posters.  The  main  slogan  was  “Turkey  is  secular  and  will  remain  secular”.  This  paper  focuses 
on the mass demonstrations to explain the nature of the crisis led by women, who name 
themselves as Kemalist. Their speeches have an authoritarian character hand in hand with 
militarism/nationalism, in which discriminative laicism is included. To clarify this character, 
the modernization project, nation-building   process   and   the   constructed   female   “republican”  
identity should be examined. Under the  introduction part, contemprorary reactions of the 
Kemalist women will be mentioned to build a bridge between the ideology in the beginning 
and the mobilization from the 1990s on.To examine and clarify the undemocratic and 
nationalistic   character   of  Kemalist  women's   aggression   and   fear   against   their   “sisters”  with  
headscarfs is the priority of this thesis. This discriminative feature of Kemalist feminism is the 
natural consequence of the Kemalist ideology and the problematic modernization project 
which urged to construct new identities during the new republic was proclaimed. This 
aggression entangled with fear has its historical roots in the monoparty period, in which the 
“Values  of  the  Republic”  they  defend  were  established. 
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                                                     Chapter I 
Case Description 
Turam (2008) describes Kemalist woman, regardless of whether she has a religious faith or 
not, she bases her life, politics, activism and worldview on laicism, a particularly rigid form of 
secularism in which religion is not only privatized but controlled by the state. Put differently, 
the controversy is not over whether an individual is religiously observant, but the wider 
politics of religion and its relation to the state. Kemalist women neglects the individual 
preferences  and  she  filters  state  related  issues  through  the  principles  of  Atatürk.   
Tekeli (1986) and White (2003) call what Kemalist women support is; ‘state  feminism’. State 
feminism means that they believe in the laicist state  as  the  main  safeguard  of  women’s  rights  
and  equality.  They  also  believe   that  Turkish  women  owe   their   ‘equal’  position in society to 
Atatürk,  who  pictured  them  as  ideal  republican  woman.  This gratitude is acknowledged as a 
prerequisite to be a good citizen, nobody can (and willing to) ciriticize him in any sense. He 
was and is the symbol of modern and secular life. When the non-Kemalist representations 
appeared   in   the   public,   Kemalist   women   couldn’t   understand   their   position   in   the   society.  
Since they were wealthy and  educated, why they still wear a headscarf, was unknown to 
them. Soon, Kemalist women recalled the early republican times and used  Atatürk’s  rhetoric  
when he tried to alienate religion in the society to strengthen the new republic towards the 
Ottoman  heritage.  His  rhetoric  was  based  on  the  statement  of    “religion  and  religious  people  
should be controlled otherwise they could  damage  the  secular  system.”   
Kemalist women against the  public manifestations of Islam, especially the headscarf have 
been  very  active  in  civil  society  organizations  and  women’s associations.  
Turam (2008) states that their militancy is increasing in tandem with the rising popularity of 
political Islam. Most importantly, and distinct from other secular actors, Kemalist women 
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remain  pioneer  advocates  of  the  military’s  dominant  role  in  ‘protecting’  the  secular  Republic.  
Their support for army intervention was lucid in the republican protests.  
The political scientist Yesim Arat (1996) sets the 1980s as the period of the transformation of 
Kemalist women into Kemalist feminists against the Islamist challenge and she claims that the 
Kemalist women see Islamist activism as well as their relationship to the republic, in intensely 
emotional terms. Kemalist women see Islamists as remainders from the Middle Ages. So they 
have the right to oppose them which derives from the secular state.  They also believe -as the 
educated  elite-  they  have  a  task  to  “enlighten”  the  reactionary  Islamists.     
As Arat points out, the Kemalist women’s activisim basicly organized itself after the 1980s as 
a result of the rise of the pro-Islamic party in the politics. The last and the biggest reaction 
was the Republican Demonstrations in 2007, which is the motivation of this thesis. Before 
getting involved with this reaction, the start of the mobilization in the 1990s should be 
mentioned. 
1.Kemalist Women vs. Political Islam  
1.1. 1990s  
With the rise of the Welfare Party, Kemalist women appeared in the arena to pose an obstacle 
to their achievements. Kemalist women took women who studied in higher education and yet 
still wanted to cover their hair as uncompresensible and not fitting for the standards of modern 
life.    Aysel  Ekşi,  the  first  president  of  the  Support  for  Modern  Life  Association  (ÇYDD)  –one 
of the leading organizations of the Republican Protests- founded in 1991, summarized the 
purpose of their organization as follows: 
For some time now, we have been facing a serious and sneaky reactionary movement in 
Turkey  which  hides  behind  the  veil  of  ‘women’s  freedom  to  dress  as  they  like’  but  endeavors  
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to take our society back to the dark ages […] we came together, conscious of this threat and 
based  upon  the  authority  given  to  us  by  Atatürk’s  revolutions,  in  order  to  preserve  Atatürk’s  
legacy, the secular republic and our rights, which are inseparable from them (Arat, 1994). 
In  this  small  passage,  Ekşi  mentions  several  keywords of Kemalist rhetoric. She talks about 
“the   freedom   to   dress   as   one   likes”   as   a   potential   threat   and   described   it      as   a   sneaky  
reactionary movement. This dress is part of a wider agenda, and an attempt to take the society 
back to the dark ages (dark ages refer to Ottoman Empire in the rhetoric). Having described 
the   “enemy”   she   calls   for   awareness   and   wants Kemalist women get together against the 
“sneaky   reactions”   to   protect   the   republic.   The   republic   belongs to them, the republic is 
actually  them.    Their  authority  comes  from  the  Atatürk’s  revolutions,  which  they  don’t  have  
to legitimize, because it was the core of the republic and legitimized long before they need to.  
As  at  the  end  she  claims  Atatürk’s  legacy should be defended in order to carry on the secular 
republic  and  women  rights.  The  rhetoric  states  that  without  Atatürk  legacy,  there  wouldn’t  be  
a   secular   state   and   subsequently   there   wouldn’t   be   rights   for   women.      So   the   scope   is  
determined; Protect   your   republic   based   upon   the  Atatürk’s   revolutions!.  These   revolutions  
are   more   important   than   any   groups   and   individuals.   In   fact   Atatürk   replaced   Islam   with  
another kind of religion called Kemalist nationalism.   
Yazıcı  (2001)  also  defines  the  1990s  as  marked  by  the  presence  of    the  “Islamic  threat”  for  the    
secularists and Ataturkist groups. After the Welfare Party's victory in municipal elections in 
1994  a  number  of  Atatürkist  social  organizations,  such  as  Atatürkçü  Düşünce  Derneği   (The  
Society   for   Atatürkist   Thought)   and   Çağdaş   Yaşamı   Destekleme   Derneği   (The   Society   to  
Support Contemporary Life), were established and continued their activism to defend a 
secularist  establishment  modeled  on  “the  principles  of  Atatürk”.   
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In the secularists' view, even more horrifying than the 1994 elections was the ascension of the 
Welfare Party to the government as one of the coalition partners in 1996. The Welfare Party's 
governance (which ended in the summer of 1997) was interpreted by the secularist sections as 
a systematic attempt to undermine the Turkish Republic and to replace it with an Islamic 
state.  Thus,  in  this  period,  there  was  great  mobilization  by  the  secularist,  Atatürkist  groups  to  
defend the Republic against what was seen as a deadly threat (Yazici, 2001). To avoid this 
dreadful threat Kemalist women manifested their clear collaboration with the military openly 
via demonstrations. There are two worth-mentioning demonstrations in this period to show 
the will to subordinate the  Islamist position and the Kemalist achievements on that. These 
two cases, in which Kemalist women went along with the military opened the path to the 
Republican Protests in 2007.  
1.1.1.Women  Walk  against  Sheri’a  15  February  1997   
The  coalition government was formed between the religious RP and the (DYP) True Path 
Party   led   by   Tansu   Çiller   in   1996,   in   which   the   RP   was   the   bigger   partner.   Soon   the   RP  
started making provocative gestures and women's groups were particularly agitated.  The 
polarization got sharper as the religious party humiliated the Kemalist symbols and  crossed 
the sentimental borders by promising mosques in the prominent squares of the cities and etc.  
Kadıoğlu   (1996)   states   that   the   polarization   has   become   so   acute   that   it   resembles   the   late  
nineteenth century Dreyfus Affair in France. 
On   15   February   1997,   under   the   initiative   of   Çağdaş   Hukukçular   Derneği   (Association   of  
Contemporary Legal Professionals), a large rally was organized in defense of secularism and 
in protest of fundamentalism. The rally was named Women's Walk Against the Shariat (Arat, 
1999).  According to the Head of the Republican Women Association 50,000 women attended 
this meeting. This protest made the problem solid and soon after,  the military intervention 
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came up when the  ruling coalition was openly challenged by the military representatives of 
the National Security Council (MGK) in its meeting of the 28 February 1997. After nine 
hours of deliberations, the declaration of the MGK expressed uneasiness about attempts to 
harm and ultimately change the secular, Kemalist nationalist and democratic character of the 
Turkish constitution. Several precautionary measures, demanded by the military branch of the 
MGK, were submitted to the cabinet. These included demands for the regulation of Koran 
courses, social and economic activities of various Islamic brotherhoods (tarikats) and a halt to 
appointments that were seen as aimed towards building an Islamic cadre within the state 
bureaucracy. The RP leader Necmettin Erbakan tried to resist the military impositions, but 
could not obtain the necessary political support. Under pressure, he signed the MGK 
decisions,  and  the    “28  February  process”  had  formally  begun.  It  was  subsequently  ended  with  
the early elections of April 1999, bringing to  power a coalition of parties with a nationalist-
secularist-liberal,  as  opposed  to  a  religious  agenda  (Çarkoğlu  &  Toprak,  2007).   
1.1.2.Merve  Kavakçı  Affair    3  May  1999 
On   3  May   1999  Merve   Kavakçı,   deputy   of   the   Islamist   Virtue   Party   caused   an   uproar   by  
attending the oath ceremony in the parliament wearing a scarf. This was the very first time 
that a covered women entered the parliamentary with   covered   hair.   As   Göçek   (1999)  
describes,  even  though  the  assembly  dress  code  only  specified  for  women  deputies  ‘a  suit  and  
modern   attire’,   the   additional   use   of   a   headscarf   signified   for   many   deputies   a   politicized  
religious practise that had no place in the national assembly. The Kemalist women deputies 
started  shouting  ‘Turkey  is  and  will  remain  secular’  and  ‘all  Merves  should  go  to  Iran’  as  they  
were  banging  on  their  desks.  She  left  the  saloon  and  didn’t  come  back  to the ceremony. The 
prominent accusation  was  made  by   the     president  of   the   republic,  Süleyman  Demirel,   as  he  
called her an “agent  provocateur”. 
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He also added that while it was indeed traditionally acceptable to wear a headscarf in public, 
the national assembly had its own rules which had to be abided by and which she clearly had 
not followed. Furthermore, he commented  that  Kavakçı's  headscarf  symbolized  the  movement  
'which aimed to turn Turkey into an Iran, Afghanistan or Algeria, and which (for that 
purpose) murdered one thousand people in Algeria'. The chief public prosecutor interpreted 
the incident in a similar  vein,  using  Kavakçı’s  action   to  start  a   lawsuit  against  her  party   for  
inciting her to take a stand against the secular principles of the state, and to eliminate, once 
and for all, all party members who 'were like vampires constantly sucking on the blood of the 
nation'   (Göçek,   1999). There was also popular protest from the media and the Kemalists 
groups  such  as  hanging  Atatürk’s  pictures  on  the  windows.  There  were  rumours  about  a  coup  
and an investigation of her personal life. Soon it was discovered that Kavakçı   has   an  
American   citizenship   and   yet   didn’t   notify   the   Turkish   state   properly.   The   Turkish   state  
accepts dual citizenship if the applicant notifies the Turkish state before applying for US 
citizenship. Due to this technicality, she was stripped of her Turkish citizenship. She was a 30 
year old US educated engineer and scared the Kemalists of being an agent, who wanted to 
transform Turkey into Iran and subsequently lost her power.  
2. AKP (2002- present) 
The restless years of 1990s taught the Kemalist women that they are not the only 
representatives of the Turkish women and that their authority would be shared soon. However 
they  were   still   defenders   of   “their”      republic   and   the   daughters   of  Atatürk.  When Cagatay 
(2009) analyses Turkish politics, she points out this separation by saying that the last decades 
in Turkey have been marked by a polarization between Secularism and Islamism which 
disrupts social life. Turkish society has been divided into camps, i.e. Secularists and Islamists, 
“us”  and  “others”. On one end of this polarization is the rapid increase in the public visibility 
of religious identities, the ascendance of religious cadres within bureaucratic ranks to high 
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level positions under the consecutive AKP (Justice and Development Party) governments 
since 2002, and the conservative and oppressive tendencies of the central and local state 
institutions adopting an Islamist discourse. On the other end, there is an excessive distrust 
towards the executive and legislative organs, a fear of political Islam among groups who 
identify themselves with the Kemalist tradition, and opposition from these groups to the 
AKP’s   rising  hegemony   through  a  discussion  of   secularism.  Çağatay  draws  attention to the 
women’s  role  in  that  polarization  and  claims  that  their  movement  is  a  determining  factor  and  
has been polarized in this cleavage, which at times has turned into a regime crisis.  
AKP (Justice and Development Party) was founded in August 2001 under the leadership of 
the ex-Istanbul  mayor   Tayyip   Erdoğan,  who,   at   the   time,  was   banned   from   politics   on   the  
grounds of having provoking religious hatred, some years back. The AKP participated in the 
2002  elections  under  Erdoğan‘s   leadership  but  Erdoğan  himself  could  not  get  elected   to   the  
parliament   because   of   his   continuing   ban.   Only   in   March   2003,   was   Erdoğan   able   to   get  
himself elected after a series of amendments to the existing legislation. He as a very popular 
political figure after his four months imprisonment baceme even more popular and beloved. 
He was the representative of the victims of the Kemalist system.  
Çarkoğlu   and   Kalaycıoğlu   (2007)   indicate   that   the   AKP   has   its   roots   in   the   pro-Islamist 
electoral tradition of the  early  1970s.  They  use  the  term  ―pro-Islamist not as a demand for an 
Islamic state or Shari'a rule, which they can not realize within the regulatory framework of the 
Turkish party system but more for relying on Islamic motives in their rhetoric and valuing 
Islam in the private sphere. Çarkoğlu  and  Toprak  (2007)  see  AKP  as  an  offspring  of  the  pro-
Islamist RP, which had a victory in the municipal elections of 1994 and then in 1995 general 
election. RP became a major electoral force in Turkish politics and was the stronger partner of 
the coalition government established after the 1995 election and the political polarization in 
the country hugely increased. This polarization eventually pushed the country into the 
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“February   28th”   period   (Soft   Coup)   and   resulted in the banning of the RP by the 
Constitutional Court. FP (Virtue Party) was then established to replace RP, but this party was 
also closed down. The outlawing of FP divided the political Islam. Çarkoğlu   and   Toprak  
(2007) describe this division as the reactions of the secularists, spearheaded by the influential 
military and also oppositions in the party made a split between old guards who controlled the 
pro-Islamist parties ever since 1970s and the younger generation led by the ex-Istanbul mayor 
Tayyip   Erdoğan   .   As   Çarkoğlu   and   Kalaycıoğlu   articulate   Tayyip   Erdoğan   was   the  
progressive wing of the traditional pro-Islamist party and the founder of the AKP. He used a 
softer tone to be conservative and he didn't challenge the secular system. However his pro-
Islamist past was never forgotten by the secularists and often updated with the help of non-
governmental Kemalist organizations and the military forces when he particularly gained the 
power in the parliament. Walter Posch (2007) says there might be two possible interpretations 
of the AKP:                                   
a) The AKP acts like any Islamist Party in the world, using democracy as a first stage, in 
order to get as much power as possible. In the Turkish context this would mean that the AKP 
would benefit from the reforms imposed on Turkey by the EU in order to curb the power of 
the Armed Forces;  
or on the contrary 
b) the AKP is indeed a new type of party, nurturing conservative sentiments when it comes to 
social matters but combining them with freemarket economics. The AKP’s official position 
goes along these lines: in official statements senior members of the party stress that the AKP 
is not an Islamic and even less than Islamist party and that the place of religion lies in private 
worship.                                                                                                                                    
The  first  position,  which  is  described  as  ‘the  other’,  ‘the  islamic  threat’,  ‘internal  enemy’  in  
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the Kemalist ideology, has a long tradition from the early republican times. This position has 
been the reason of all the Kemalist women movements so far.  Second position is majorly 
supported by the liberals, businessmen/women and new electorates. Although the party seems 
like the combination of both positions, which has been indeed europanised as well as having a 
conservative discourse to their core electorate, Kemalists always suspect it of running a secret 
agenda defined as transformation of the Turkish Republic into Iran.  
The   most   reactionary   group   in   the   society   against   the   AKP   and   Erdoğan   have been the 
Kemalist women, who perceived the Islamic upsurge as a threat, and organized to counter it. 
They supported the military as the democracy protector and their emancipator. This emotional 
link between Kemalist women and the military caused an agitated language within the 
society.  Turam (2008) also points out the polarization between women when she analyzes the 
AKP government by saying in the early phase of AKP's rule in Turkey (2002–4), the pro-
Islamic government of the AKP (Justice and Development party) and various branches of the 
state collaborated in a series of political and economic reforms. The democratization process 
has gradually moderated and integrated Islamic actors into the secular Turkish Republic. 
However, it has also had polarizing effects on social groups. Among many, the polarization of 
two  groups  of  women,  ‘pious’  and  ‘secularist’,  deserves  particular  attention. 
2.1.Republican Protests 2007 
The polarization between Kemalist women and the women with headscarves became concrete 
when the street protests started taking place in 2007 before the presidential elections. These 
protests were organized and attended predominantly by women and their message to the 
government was that they defend 'their' secular republic. The warning was that the AKP 
governance  was  to  abandon  “republican  gains”.  The  Committee  of  the  Demonstrations  called  
the  rallies  “People’s  March  for  the  Republic”.  They  made  the  first  one  in  Ankara  and  later, a 
series  of  protests  were  organized  under  the  name  of  “Republican  Protests”.    The  character  of  
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the  Republican  demonstrations  crystallized  around  the  “headscarf  issue,”  and  was escorted by 
huge Turkish flags carried by the participants. Here is the summary of the protests city by city 
as they appeared on the news.  
2.1.1.Ankara 14 April 2007  
The rally came two days before the presidential elections started and was intended to pressure 
current  Prime  Minister  R.T.  Erdoğan  not  to  join.    On 14 April 2007 BBC News reported that 
some 300,000 people have demonstrated in Turkey's capital, Ankara, to demand that religion 
and politics should be kept separate in their country.  BBC also conveyed that the protesters 
carried banners of Kemal Ataturk, the revered founder of the Turkish republic as a secular 
state. He was accused of having a secret agenda about transformation of the country into Iran.  
Tens   of   thousands   of   people   came   to   near   Atatürk’s   mausoleum.   BBC   reporter   (14   April  
2007) conveyed that the area was packed with people, many of them draped in the red-and-
white national flag and chanting anti-Islamic  slogans.  The  most  repeated  slogan  was  “Turkey  
is  secular  and  will  remain  secular  forever.”  BBC  interviewed  some  of  the  demonstrators.     “I 
feel a little scared about the developments. I would not like to have an Islamic regime in 
Turkey," one demonstrator, who gave her name as Nursel, told the BBC. "I would like to 
protect the secular system. That's why I am here. Especially as a female, this is very important 
for me." (BBC, 2007a).  
2.1.2.Istanbul 29 April 2007  
Two weeks after the rally in Istanbul, the committee decided to organize another rally, this 
time in Istanbul. They announced that it was demanded by the society.  The current president 
declared that he  would  not   run  for   the  elections  but   their  candidate  was  Abdullah  Gül,  who  
was the head of the party before he was able to be elected.  
As BBC (29 April 2007) reported hundreds of thousands of people rallied in Istanbul of 
secularism in Turkey, amid a row over  a  vote  for  the  country’s  next  president.    In  this  rally  the  
 
25 
 
demonstrators  still  claimed  that  the  ruling  party’s  candidate  for  the  post  remained  loyal  to  his  
Islamic roots. On 27 April 2007 the army posted a statement on its website and accused the 
government of tolerating radical Islam and vowed to defend secularism.Business leaders also 
claimed  early  elections.  However  Abdullah  Gül  announced  that  he  would  not  quit  despite  the  
growing  critics   from  opponents  and   the  army.  Abdullah  Gül  accelerated  Turkey’s  European  
Union accession as foreign minister and was seen as less confrontational than Prime Minister 
Erdoğan  but  these facts didn’t  convince  Kemalists  or  as  BBC  calls  them  Secularists  due  to  his  
wife’s  headscarf.  His  wife  would  be  the  first  First  Lady to wear a headscarf, which provoked 
the   Kemalists   the   most.   “Turkey   is   secular   and   will   remain   secular,”   again   shouted   the  
demonstrators   from  all  over   the  country  as   they  waved   flags  and  pictures  of  Atatürk.  Many  
sang nationalist songs called for the government’s   resignation.   The   rally  was   an   enormous  
show of force. AKP spokesman Cemil Cicek responded to Friday's unusually forthright army 
statement, saying any intervention was inconceivable in a democratic state. The military, 
which led coups in the past, said it was concerned by the party's choice of presidential 
candidate (Mardell, 2007). Mardell (2007) also claimed that the army statement should be a 
message to the constitutional court judges to declare the vote invalid and dissolve the 
parliament.  
2.1.3.Manisa 5 May 2007 
Tens of thousands of Turks were taken to the streets again to show their support for Turkey's 
secular system. The protest in the western town of Manisa came a day before a key vote in 
parliament on the presidency. The ruling AK party tried  to have its candidate, Foreign 
Minister Abdullah Gul, elected. A court ruled out an earlier vote after an opposition boycott 
meant there was no valid quorum in parliament. The protest was the third one within that 
month to be organized by supporters of Turkey's secular constitution. 
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Earlier protests in Ankara and Istanbul drew more than a million people. An early election 
aimed at ending the crisis would be held on 22 July. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan 
had said that the constitutional court’s ruling was like "firing a bullet at democracy". He 
further said that he wanted the president to be elected by the people not by parliament. On 
Saturday, Mr. Gül said he would win easily if that was the case. "Support for me is 70% 
[among the public]," he said. The opposition accused Mr. Gül of having a hidden Islamist 
agenda and said that if he became president it would threaten Turkey's secular tradition. He 
and the prime minister denied the accusations (BBC, 2007b).  
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Figure I. 14 April 2007 Ankara 
 
Figure II. 14 April 2007, Ankara  (near  Atatürk’s  Mausoleum) 
 
28 
 
 
              
Figure III. 29 April 2007, Istanbul  (On  the  Poster  of  Atatürk:  „Sleep  well”) 
Figure IV. 5 May 2007, Manisa  
 
 
Figure V. 13 May 2007, Izmir 
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2.1.4.Izmir 13 May 2007 
At least one million Turks have rallied in the city of Izmir to protest against any government 
plans to undermine Turkish secularism. The major demonstration was the fourth since the 
ruling AKP nominated Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül as its candidate for the country's 
presidency. Many Turks suspected Mr. Gül of having an Islamic agenda, something he denied 
before withdrawing his candidacy. Parliamentary elections scheduled for November are now 
to be held in July. The AKP - which has roots its in political Islam - argued that a general 
election would only prove that it consist of widespread public support. The government had 
also backed a constitutional reform package that would allow the president to be directly 
elected by the people. There were loud calls at the latest rally for opposition parties to unite 
and weaken the AKP at the polls. Opinion polls showed that the AKP remained the most 
popular party in Turkey, despite the mass protests. The demonstration in Izmir - Turkey's 
third-largest city - was the fourth mass gathering in favor of the republic in as many weeks. 
Buildings and streets in Izmir were covered in flags and portraits of Kemal Ataturk, the 
founder of the republic. Boats flying the flag also joined the demonstration in Izmir's harbor. 
The main slogan, once again, was that Turkey is secular and will stay secular, a BBC 
correspondent said. Many of those rallying knew that their main aim was to make a clear 
statement to the government. "The AK Party will most likely win the elections but they will 
have to take into account these demonstrations and what people are saying," said Haluk Berk, 
a doctor and university teacher. "These rallies have been useful in forcing the government to 
take a step back," protester Neslihan Erkan told the Reuters news agency. "The danger is still 
not over. These rallies must continue until there is no longer a threat." Many secularists 
consider the government's efforts to confirm Mr. Gül as president as evidence of a hidden 
Islamist political agenda. The military, which regards itself as the guardian of Turkey's 
secularism, had also indicated its opposition to the AK Party's move (BBC, 2007c). 
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3. The Consequence of the Protests 
As the consequence of the protests and the demands from several different actors, the AKP 
government decided on early parliamentarian elections before the presidential elections took 
place. 2007 parliamentarian elections again resulted with the victory of the AKP headed by 
Erdoğan.  Subsequently,  Abdullah  Gül  was  elected  as  the  state  president.  Having  received  so  
much power in the legislative and executive branches of the state, AKP started a big cleansing 
for   the  military  members,  who   intervened   the  political   life.  The   slogan   “Turkey   is   and  will  
remain   secular”   remained as the motto of Kemalists but the secular state is not anymore 
“guarded”   by   the   military.   This   military   feature   of   the protests has been discussed. The 
Kemalist reflex associated with antidemocratic behavior, which relies on the army and the 
constitutional court rather than the initiative of the society. The following chapter aims at 
clarifying the historical roots of this Kemalist reflex. The historical roots of Kemalist rhetoric 
is simultaneously the history of the modernization adventure of Turkey.  
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Chapter II 
Historical Roots of the Rhetoric of Kemalist Woman’s  at  the  
Republican Protests 
The national woman is the mother of her children, comrade to her husband and a pioneer of 
modern civilized life (Göle,  1991). The national woman was created multi-functional and she 
was the corner stone of the Kemalist ideology in its expansion either as a mother or a 
professional. Her role was to be the pioneer of modern civilized life. Her contemporary 
struggle to define the public sphere primarily  as  “uncovered”  and  also “Turkish” as they did 
in the Republican Protests. Kemalist women claimed that they are the  true representative of 
the nation and the rest of society should follow . This stance of the Kemalist women has 
deepened the cleavages between women in spite of their claim to represent, modernize and 
liberate all women. In this   conjuncture   Kemalist   women’s   earlier   role   as   educators   and  
modernizers was seriously questioned, differences between women became more visible and 
adopted new dimensions at the same time. The hegemony of Kemalist women within 
women’s   activism in Turkey was openly questioned, and the political, social and cultural 
representation  of  “Turkish  women”  became  a  field  of  struggle  (Çağatay,  2009).   
They wanted their position as the true representatives of Turkish women back and the 
Republican Protests showed  that  the  contemporary  Kemalist  women’s  organizations  were  not  
anymore   only   responding   to  Kemalism’s   abiding   call   to women to guard its principles but 
also they organized to defend their inherited political, socio-economic, and cultural privileges 
in Turkish society. As Turam argues (2008) as the socio-economic and educational gap 
between these groups of women decreased in the wake of democratization over the past 
decade, their different patterns of political engagement and leadership have come to divide 
them even further. Kemalist women struggled for their autonomous political cause.   
Necla Arat and Nur Serter were the prominent actors in the Republican Protests due to their 
efforts in the organization committee but also their prominent Kemalist rhetoric in general. 
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Their speeches, which are analyzed below, had strong Kemalist motives, basing on 
nationalism with militarism and laicim with antidemocratic tendencies. Since their claim is 
that they are the true representatives of the Republic, it is important to see how they want to 
construct  themselves  and  the  “others”,  so  that  the  current  polarization  will  be  comprehensible  
for the reader. 
1)Necla Arat 
Necla Arat was born in 1940 and studied in the U.S.A..  She is an university professor and 
one of the founders of the Women Studies department at the University of Istanbul. She 
works for several of non-governmental organizations for women.  During the republican 
protests, she was a parliamentarian from the opposition party CHP.  On April 29, her speech 
was as follows;  
“Beloved  children  of  the  secular  republic,  citizens,  young  people  of  all  ages,who  don’t  betray  
Mustafa  Kemal’s  escrow.  Welcome  to  the  Çağlayan  Rally  for  the  Republic.    I  greet  all  of  you  
with love and respect on the behalf of the organization committee.” 
Arat started her speech from the beginning with defining the sides, which are two; the ones 
who  don’t  betray  Mustafa  Kemal’s  state  and  the  ones  do.  The  ones  that  do  betray  the  escrow  
were the reason of the protests. Serter on the behalf of the Organization Committee clearly 
stayed  loyal  to  the  early  modernization  spirit;;  the  duality  of    “us”  and  the  “others”.   
“As you know, in order to  protect  our  republic  we  met  at  Tandoğan.  We  announced  our  voice  
together to the whole world. Today, those who joined the rally in Caglayan, from Istanbul, all 
over Europe and Anatolia, are here to demonstrate their commitment to the defense of 
national honor and independence and protect the basic values and principles of the nation 
state.” 
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 The   role  of  protecting   the   republic  was  given   to   the  Kemalists   and  Atatürk  mentioned   this  
task  in  his  statements.  As  Nükhet  Sirman  (2002)  claims  Kemalism  is  an  ‘emotional’  ideology  
which always deals with honour, values and principles. The state was given human features 
and the nation was anticipated for an endless struggle to keep them as they were established in 
the beginning.  
“We  are  here  to  say  no  to  the  global and local master of collaborators, who have dirty plans 
on our political, economic and cultural independence, we  are here to give a great lesson to  
those  who  have  an  agenda  on  our  political,  economic  and  cultural  liberty.”  
Another remarkable feature of Kemalism is, that its definition without internal and external 
enemies who are always after ruining the state is not possible. The social engineering relies on 
the cleansing and finding the enemies within and outside the society. That is the reason, a true 
citizen   must   live   naturally   on   alert   and   ask   for   “real   reasons”   not   to   be   on   the   side   of  
Kemalists.  
“  We  are  here  to  defend  Turkey's  secular  nature  and  stop  the  sneaky  practises  of  those  who  
want to change it step by step, we are here! We are here to show them that nation state and 
nationalism  are  alive.  We  are  here  to  prove  those  who  don’t  accept  the  positivism  and  science  
in the founding principles of the republic, are wrong.”   
Arat sees no problem in showing her admiration for the nation state and pride of being a 
nationalist. The enemies are always undercover to damage this system but Kemalists are 
aware  of  it  and  won’t  let  it  happen.  The  positivism  and  science  are  possessed  by  the  Kemalist  
state   and   the   ones,   who   don’t   support   Kemalism,   should   be   also against science in their 
opinion.  
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“We  are  here  to  show  that  we  don’t  believe  those  who  use  the  democracy  as  a  tool  to  take  its  
advantage. Those who say political Islam should first occupy the decision mechanisms must 
see   that   it’s   a   dead-end road and those who instrumentalise the religion will ultimately 
perish.”  
The skeptism about the democracy and those who are in favor of it create fear. Non of the 
liberties should be allowed if there is an any chance to harm the nation state. Indeed 
Kemalism should be protected but democracy could be sometimes neglected at the cost of 
Kemalist  secular  state.  Köker  (2010)  in  his  book  “Modernization,  Kemalism  and  Democracy”  
claims that Kemalism never sees the pluralist democracy as the achievement at the end. The 
scope was  rather  creating  a  society  that  ‘acts’  like  western.   
 We are here to announce that our nationalist, secular, anti-imperial alliance keep the 
national interests and honour on top of everything. We share the same emotions and ideas 
with millions from all over Turkey.  
This is the populist discourse that CHP often uses as an anti-imperialist party. However their 
policies on non-Kemalists   have   been   extremely   imperial   or   as   Kadıoğlu   (1999)   calls   it  
colonial and also oriental. The emotional togetherness is an important paradigm. 
We  are  here  to  call  them  to  stop  their  permanent  conflict  with  the  republic’s  basic  institutions  
and values. We are here to say that we want a government as well as a president, which 
 respects the laws of the Revolution. We are here to warn the opposition parties about the 
danger that the democracy and the secular regime are into. They need to come together. We 
are the people! We are the rulers! We are here to tell Mustafa Kemal that we are the owners  
and the defenders of the principles and we are here to say we protect our republic. I give my 
regards.”  
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Arat  divides the government and the state institutions, particularly the constitutional court, 
into two as one side is the potential traitor and on the other side loyal member of the Kemalist 
system.  The   “danger”   is   so   close   that  Arat   calls   the   opposition   parties   for   a   coalition,  who  
completely share different worldviews. However, it is just a detail when it is about the nation 
state  and  the  Atatürk  principles.  The  state  which  was  given  by  Atatürk  should  be  protected.  
The  rest   is  a  bunch  of  traitors  and  leftist  dreamers  who  are  not  aware  of   the  “danger”.  “Are  
you  aware  of   the  danger?”  is  a  well- known motto of the newspaper Cumhuriyet often used 
against the pro-Islamist society. The polarization was emphasized truely and named as 
Protectors vs. Betrayers.  
2)Nur Serter 
Professor Nur Serter was born in 1948 and studied at the Istanbul University. She worked for 
the Support   for  Modern  Life  Association   (ÇYDD)  and  The  Atatürkist  Thought Association 
(ADD). She is a parliamentarian at the opposition party CHP.  Her speech at the meeting was 
as follows:  
“Welcome, fully independent Turkey lovers, democracy lovers, defenders of the secular 
republic, and true representatives of Turkey! We are here and we are the Turkish nation. We 
are the real owners of the secular and democratic republic. We are proud of being Turkish. 
We  won’t  let  them  realize  their  plan  of  invading  Cankaya.  Will  you  let  them?  –No.”   
Serter starts with the standard sensitivities of the Kemalist ideology such as defending and 
protecting  the  country  and  being  the  “real”  owner  of  it.  She  adds,  after  acknowledging  that  the  
state   belongs   to   them,   the   secret   plan   of   invading   presidency   (Çankaya)   wouldn’t   work  
because  they  won’t  let  them.  
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We are facing a mentality, which calls the General Commander of Turkey an officer. We 
kneel with respect in front of the Turkish Armed Force, in front of our glorious army. Long 
live Turkish Army! On April 27, the Turkish Army heard your voice, our voice and protected 
our voice and democracy. They protected secular republic and the real will of Turkish people. 
We allow nobody to insult the Turkish army.”   
This   is   the   lucid   expression  of   the   ideology.  Serter   talks   about   the  Prime  Minister  Erdoğan  
here, who calls the head of the army as an officer of the state. She defined the army as the 
guarantee of the principles and with her militarist approach; the speech became a inciting for a 
coup or at least intervention of the military. The justification of the intervention was the need 
to be protected.  
“Stop challenging Ataturk principles and reforms. And also stop challenging with his 
institutions. Stop abusing religion. Stop working with the imperialism. You can not ignore the 
people who protect their secular republic. Stop the election immediately. Go for the early 
elections! Let the people elect. Nationalists, patriots, social democrats get together! All the 
opposition should come together. Let bring Turkey again under the light of Ataturk! Get 
together!” 
 Serter  ends  her  speech  as  Arat  before  with  a  “get  together”  invitation  to  the  opposing  parties.  
The   ideological   differences   don’t   matter.   What   matters   is,   that   Kemalism   shouldn’t   be  
threatened by the Islamist forces that have a secret plan to transform the country to Ottoman 
times, in which people were pre-modern. The well-known wish of Kemalist women for 
Turkey   is   the   ability   to   get   back   to   the   “Golden   Age”   of   Atatürk.   Through   a   strong  
indoctrination,   particularly   women   were   made   believe   that   they   owe   Atatürk and 
nationalization everything. Here is a sample of daily propaganda of this ideology.  
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On every school-day in the morning a nearly identical ceremony takes place the length and 
breadth of Turkey. Children line up in school-yards from the Thracian border with Greece to 
the steep mountains stacked up against the Iraqi frontier. In the massive concrete sprawl of 
Istanbul, in whitewashed Mediterranean villages, in the harsh towns of the Anatolian plateau 
and in hamlets hidden in the forests of the Black Sea coast, the voices of teachers rise above 
the excited chatter. When silence has been imposed, morning assembly gets under way, 
usually with the aid of a scratchy amplifier. Though not officially religious, the ceremony 
which ensues is part of a ritual indoctrination in the ideology of the Turkish republic founded 
in  1923  by  Mustafa  Kemal  Atatürk.  'I  am  a  Turk!  I  am  honest!  I  am  industrious!'  the  children  
shout in proud unison, whatever part their ancestors may have played in Turkey's jumbled 
mosaic of ethnic groups, religions and migrations. The slogans are various, but the message is 
the same for the young would-be  citizens  of  modern  Turkey.   'O  Great  Atatürk,   I  vow  that   I  
will  march  unhesitatingly  along  the  road  you  opened,  towards  the  goal  you  showed!’   (Pope, 
2004)  
This morning ceremony told by Pope takes place in front  of  an  Atatürk  bust. This vow is part 
of the school life of children aged between 7 and 12, which is also completed with national 
hymn on Fridays as the closing of the week. There are other hymns, songs, poems for national 
celebrations, which create a great atmosphere to be a 'Turk' and defend it 'unhesitatingly' from 
the very early age. These elements of indoctrination such as ceremonies, official history 
books, speeches of school teachers and national symbols are the grand protectors of the 
republic. In these Atatürk  and  his  reforms  can  not  be  criticized and should be embraced and 
protected.  
Atatürk’s adopted daughter Afet Inan (1981) opposes the authoritarian character of the 
republic by saying that Atatürk's   political   philosophy   was   not   dogmatic,   but   practical   and  
flexible; it was logical and objective and added that the  founders of the modern Turkish 
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Republic were wise enough not to copy any of the doctrinaire revolutions which had emerged 
in the 19th Century. Afet Inan claimed that these revolutions were based on theories which 
could not be applied in countries where different conditions prevailed. This argument gave 
clues   about   the   “uniqueness”   of   the   perceived   parliamentarian   democracy by the Founders.  
The Turkish Republic mainly stood on Westernization as modernization and struggling with 
the   “other”,   whoever   resisted   the   new   practices.   The   “other”   of   the   system  was   chosen   as  
Ottoman, which was an enormous cultural being relied on different religions and nations. 
Atatürk’s   reorganization   and   exclusion   of   those,   who   didn’t   fit   the   picture,   created   an  
authoritarian state with modernization policies.  
Two principles; nationalism and secularism were the important paradigms of the new system. 
Their relation to women can not be comprehensible without the Ottoman heritage. The 
modernization attempts of Ottoman should be acknowledged to see  the unnecessary gratitude 
addressing the Republic. 
1.Denying Ottoman Heritage  
 
The republic was based on the denial of the Ottoman heritage and its contributions to the 
society. The main claim is that all the reforms for the sake of modernization/westernization 
were first made efficiently and truly by Turkish Republic and on the contrary Ottoman 
Sultans were in favor of their Islamist worldview, which kept the society poor and illiterate. In 
this frame, the sides were established, the Ottoman was the symbol of backwardness and the 
Turkish Republic was the starter of the reforms, the survivor of the country and the 
emancipator of women. The women body was the main signifier in this process. Tekeli (1986) 
argues that giving rights to women was to prove the democratic nature of the Turkish 
Republic ruled by a single party. However, Turkey was far from being democratic and 
opposite to its claim it was also a continuation of the Ottoman Empire. 
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What is modernization? 
Göle  (2011)  describes  modernism  as   ‘awareness’  and  ‘ability   to  make  a  decision’.  She puts 
modernism in the western zone, where the state and the people have a longer bargaining 
tradition on rights. Göle   says   on   the   contrary   of  modernism,  modernization   doesn’t   have   a  
liberal character and the actors are mostly state elites. In the case of Turkey they consisted of 
the military and the bureaucracy. They wanted   to   ameliorate   the   country   ‘despite   of’   the  
illiterate people.  
Hasan  Bülent  Kahraman  (2008)  claims  both  Ottoman  and Republican modernizations aimed 
to  find  an  answer  to  the  question  'How  to  save  the  state?’.  The reason for the modernization 
was to ameliorate the holy one: the State. Naturally the amelioration reflected to the society as 
well and it also became part of the process however the priority of the state never diminished.  
According to general acceptance of the scholars (Ahmad, 1999; Berkes, 1998; Jayawardena, 
1986;;  Koker,  2010;;  Zürcher,  2003) the westernization process of Turkish society started with 
the Ottoman Empire in the late 19th century on the contrary of the official history which gave 
all the share to Ataturk and his party. Çakır  (2007)  claims  that  the roots of modernization in 
Turkey are located in the final period of the Ottoman Empire (1839–1918). She defines both 
Ottoman and Turkish reformers as French Jacobins; they were centralist, authoritarian, and 
insistent with regard to realizing the ideals of the Enlightenment.  
1.1.The modernization in Ottoman 
Selim III 
The institutions and the ideological movements transferred to the republic from the late 19th 
century; however the need of modernization appeared in the beginning of 18th century. The 
modernization  as  westernization  was  described   two  hundred  years  before  Atatürk.  From the 
18th century on the Ottoman Empire started to reconsider its position in the world political 
system. The prestigious years remained as nostalgia due to the Western developments in 
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economics and military. Tulip Period (1718-1730) was the symbol of new policies and 
programs which created a rupture from the Ottoman state ethos basing on religion and jihad. 
Berkes (1998) claims that the elites of this period started getting involved with the European 
culture and reforms, subsequently the aggression of Ottoman died down. The territorial 
integrity was threatened by the consequences of the French Revolution. In order to regain 
power, first reforms were made in the field of military. Sultan Selim was assassinated by 
Janissaries (Household Troops of Ottoman) when he wanted to carry on with the reforms to 
ameliorate administration and military forces in 1807. Tulip Period and Sultan Selim III were 
instrumentalised during the nation-building to show barbarism of religious people who 
insisted on status quo. However Sultan Selim and his period were also used as a symbol of the 
unnecessary luxury the sultans used to have. 
Mahmut II 
Mahmut II was his successor and the performer of the modernization wave he started. Having 
witnessed Sultan Selim's tragic end, Mahmut II first quashed the Janissaries and then iniated 
the reforms. The massacre of the Janissaries, known to the reformers as the Vak'a-i Hayriye – 
the Auspicious Incident- completed the preparatory work which the Sultan had already begun 
with his campaigns to end provincial autonomy. The valley-lords and notables in the 
provinces, the Janissaries and dervishes in the capital, all those who restricted the arbitrary 
power of the Sultan, had been crushed and destroyed. Now no group remained that could 
challenge the Sultan's will. [...] Between the destruction of the Janissaries in 1826 and his 
death in 1839, Mahmud II embarked on a great program of reforms; in them he laid down the 
main lines along which later Turkish reformers, in the nineteenth and to some extent even in 
the twentieth century , were to follow. In each field of reform, the creation of a new order was 
proceeded by the destruction of an old one (Lewis, 1968).  “Naval  and  military  students  were  
sent to France and other European countries for training: 'the first outriders of a great 
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procession of Turkish students to Europe, who on their return played a role of immense 
importance to the transformation of their country' (Lewis, 1968). Mahmut II took religion, 
bureaucracy and army  under  the  state  control.  As  Ilber  Ortaylı  (2005)  claims  Murat  II  built  a  
strong bureaucracy in the empire, which opened a path to the modern state. In 1826 he made a 
reform in clothing likewise Atatürk, which would be called 'Wardrobe Revolution' in a 
pejorative sense. His policy was the centralization of the Ottoman Empire. Berkes (1998) says 
the period beginning with the collapse of the New Order untill the 1830s was spent to create a 
bureauctatic monarchie with totalitarian tendencies, which also fed new Turkish Republic 
later. The most significant outcome of these changes was the creation of a new bureaucratic 
class.This class, though loyal to the sultan and the Ottoman dynasty, possessed a higher sense 
of loyalty to the state which its members no longer saw as being manifested only in the person 
of the sultan. These new officials, who launched a new programme of reform and 
reorganization known in Turkish as the Tanzimat, were steeped in Western ideas and looked 
to Europe as their model and inspiration. Throughout the nineteenth century the men of the 
Tanzimat, followed by the Young Ottomans and the Young Turks, fought hard to establish 
European principles (Ahmad, 1999). By the mid-19th century, the Ottoman Empire was 
named as “sick  man”  by  Europeans.  More modernization or westernization was the solution 
and   Sultan   Abdülmecit   followed   his   father   Mahmut   II   by   declaring   Tanzimat   Fermanı  
(Reorganization) in 1839 on which he guaranteed everybody that taxes would be collected 
fairly and all should practise religon   in   full   liberty   and   with   equal   rights   (Zürcher,   2003).   
Superiority of Europe was accepted with this edict. The reforms made prior to the Tanzimat 
were conformed with the  principles of traditionalism and commitment to Islamic principles. 
After Tanzimat Europe was taken as a model in renovations. The State concept, bureaucratic 
organization, army, education, commercial and penal laws and even partly the court 
organization were changed according to their European samples. As a result, a duality within 
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the State occurred almost in every area (Acer, 2009). As Acer stated the reforms before 
Tanzimat  Fermanı,  were  more  focused  on  giving  a  re-birth to the empire. However Tanzimat 
Fermanı  (Reorganization) as it's meaning reorganized the society and created a duality which 
is Old and New. The edict's other scope was to avoid the interference of Europe with internal 
affairs of the Ottoman Empire with the excuse of protecting minorities. There is a consensus 
among scholars on the fundamental changes with the Tanzimat in the theocratic Sultanate to 
the starting of a modern state. Berkes points out that Tanzimat was not welcomed especially 
by the muslim groups due to its non-muslim friendly character, which can be perceived as the 
resistance against modernization. However the modernization process was organized by the 
elites and went on without involving the opponents or any of the civilians outside of the 
frame. The most important contribution of the Tanzimat Edict to the Turkish history is that 
the first Ottoman intelligentsia raised in this term and that the first important step was taken 
on the way to realize the constitutional regime (Acer, 2009).  
Abdülaziz 
In 1861 Abdul Aziz started ruling the empire, who visited London, Paris and Vienna in 1867. 
He was the first Sultan, who travelled to Europe without political reasons. This incident can 
also be taken as an evidence of the interest and admiration to the West by the state elites. At 
the time that European ideas were spreading in the Ottoman Empire, a new literary movement 
arose which broke from the classical Turkish style and inspired by French writing. They tried 
to reconcile the Turkish Muslim identity with the pressure for modernization. After studying 
in France, they came back with ambitious plans. These liberal reformers, known as the 
'Young Ottomans' were an organization of Ottoman nationalist intellectuals formed in 1865, 
influenced by Western thinkers and the French Revolution. In the time of nationalism they 
developed a concept of Ottomanism in order to hold the population together. In addition to the 
"Ottomanism" they created a dynastic state that would subordinate Islam to secular 
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institutions and allow non-Muslim subjects to participate in representative parliamentary 
institutions. They wanted a state depending on a constitution and a parliamentary. In 1867 
they revolted against the Sultan and the absolutism, which ended with their defeat, 
subsequently the organization was declared forbidden and its members were sent to exil. They 
carried on the opposition and started the tradition of directing opposition from the outside of 
the country (Deringil, 1998). 
Abdülhamit  II 
In 1876, Abdulhamit II came to the throne and declared the First Constitutional Rule. 
Parliament itself sat (in two sessions) until February 13,1878, when the Sultan used the 
emergency situation brought about by the war to dissolve it and to prorogue the constitution 
indefinitely.  From  then  on,  Sultan  Abdülhamit  ruled  his  country  as  a  true  autocrat  for  thirty  
years. Bernard Lewis (1968) doesn’t  agree  with  the  extremely  negative  image  of  Aldülhamit's  
reign, and thinks that there were continuiing elements between the Tanzimat and Hamidian 
periods. Sultan  Abdülhamit  is  an  important  figure  in  the  republic  history  as  well. He has been 
often mentioned to emphasize his unjust despotism in order to make republican propoganga. 
His improvements in the fields of education and communications had never been the topic.In 
his period  the number of Western-type schools and the number of graduates increased and in 
1900 the University of Istanbul opened. With the expansion of education for the first time the 
lower strata of population felt the Western influence. Deringil (1998) states this deeply 
divergent  perspectives  on  Abdülhamit  held  by  Turkish   'Islamists'  and 'Secularists' is but one 
instance of the 'deep emotional divide [that] exists between these two perspectives. Each 
camp tends to conceive the other as a representative of a hostile world view, as if they live in 
seperate worlds. Lewis (1968) writes that the second Turkish constitutional regime (1908-
1918) lasted longer than the first one, but it too ended in failure, bitterness and 
dissappointment. The dangers and difficulties, at home and abroad, were too great; the 
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defenders of the constitution were too few, too weak, too inept. Though the constitution 
remained in force and elections were still held, the regime degenerated into a kind of military 
oligarcy of the Young Turk leaders, which ended only with the defeat of the Ottoman Empire 
in 1918. The military oligarcy of the Young Turk leaders influenced the new Turkish 
Republic.  
Young Turk Revolution 
As Lewis (1968) states this revolution made by the Young Turks was the last hope to save the 
state  in  combination  with  the  liberal  promises.  “Bu  devlet  nasıl  kurtarılabilir”- “How can this 
state be saved”, was asked for the last time under the roof of the Ottoman Empire. Lewis 
(1968) describes the Young Turk Revolution as a patriotic movement of Muslim Turks, 
mostly soldiers, whose prime objective was to remove a fumbling and incompetent ruler and 
replace him by a government better able to maintain and defend the Empire against the 
dangers that threatened it. With the coming of the 1908 Revolution something made itself felt 
for the first time: the Turkish masses reacted politically rather than religiously. Unnoticed, the 
Hamidian regime had served to split the religion from the state in the minds not only of the 
educated but also of the masses. At last, the masses had entered into a stage where there could 
be a political association existing apart from the state and continuing when government 
collapsed (Berkes, 1998). Westernization, Islamization and Turkification were the competing 
bases for the reformation of the major social institutions- state, religion, family, education and 
economy (Berkes, 1998). The Young Turks movement included the Kemalist group, which 
would appear after the failure in World War I and organized the Liberation War with a motive 
of settling the nation-state of the Turks. The Young Turks were seperated between these two 
tendencies, which were liberals, demanding some measure of decentralization and of some 
autonomous rights for the religious and national minorities; on the one hand, and the 
nationalists claiming for central authority and Turkish domination on the other hand. The 
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political instrument of the nationalist Young Turks was the Committee of Union and Progress. 
This party included different voices but the state oriented authoritarian features were accepted 
by the all members.  
World War I 
The empire had shrunk significantly with the loss of Libya to Italy in 1911-1912 and the 
amputation of the Balkan province in 1912-1913. The empire had become much more 
homogeneous and the Unionists (nationalists) were forced to rethink their entire ideology and 
administrative policy. They could not abandon any of the three elements in their ideology -
Ottomanism, Islam and nationalism- and any change could only be one of emphasis. Despite 
the increasing importance of Turks as the most significant numerical group, Islam and not 
nationalism received the most emphasis; only some intellectuals in the capital took Turkish 
nationalism seriously (Ahmad, 1999). As Ahmad points out here, nationalism even in the time 
of disintegration was supported by only limited elites. People were still under the roof of 
Islam and their cultural identity was depending on it. The turfication policies of the Young 
Turk’s   party, which was the Committee of Union and Progress was still holding all the 
opposing ideas altogether.  In 1918 the Committee of Union and Progress, aware of its 
coming defeat, took the first steps to organize a national resistance movement, both in the 
capital and in the provinces [...] The plan to continue the struggle as a national guerilla from 
Anatolia was not new in 1918, but dated from 1915 [...] Mustafa Kemal took his final 
decision to go to Anatolia relatively late, probably around the middle of April, 1919, after he 
tried for six months to gain an infuential position in politics in the capital [...] When Mustafa 
Kemal was appointed Inspector of the Ninth Army, the intention was that he should restore 
order in the Eastern Black Sea region. There were no means of banishing him from the capital 
nor a conscious attempt on the part of the government to start a national resistance movement. 
The officers were aware of Mustafa Kemal's plans and supported him in their execution 
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(Zürcher,  1984). On  the  contrary  of  the  historical  fact  that  Atatürk  was in cooperation with the 
CUP, the official history claims that  Atatürk  organized   the  National  War  secretly  and  when  
the   Ottoman   sultan   heard   about   it,   they   tried   to   chase   Atatürk   to   prevent   him   to   save   the  
country.  
1.2. Ottoman Women 
The modernization period of the Ottoman Empire was also a stage for the debate on women 
rights since there was an active struggle by Ottoman women on the very topic. There were 
mainly two sides as on all the topics in the time of duality. Kandiyoti (1991) states women in 
the Ottoman polity were constituted as an ideological terrain upon which these two opposing 
viewpoints fought out their conflicts. These two opposing groups soon would appear in the 
new Republic under the name of Kemalists, who supported the radical changes and Islamists, 
who were moderate and had a more religious discourse than nationalist. There has been a 
clear continuity of seeing women as an ideological terrain since both modernization elites 
wanted to create responsible citizens, who should be educated and enlightened to be the 
perfect mothers for the modern citizens of the Ottoman Empire/Turkish Republic. In 19th 
century women started being politically active before the state elites subjected them as the 
symbol   of   modernity.   Serpil   Çakır   (2007),   who   initiated a deep research on Ottoman 
feminism  by  examining  the  magazines  and  journals  they  published,  stated  that  ‘to  wake  up,  to  
see,  and   to  demand’  are   three  verbs   that  Ottoman  women  used   to  describe   their  movement.  
Since the late nineteenth century, along with the processes of change and progress in different 
areas of the Ottoman world, women brought their demands for rights and freedom to the fore. 
They began to express themselves in society and created an agenda and awareness regarding 
their own rights in the public opinion. They created journals and associations in order to 
discuss their problems and propose solutions. While journals helped to amplify their voices, 
the associations helped to transform their individual claims into socially organized demands. 
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Sirman (1988) writes about a particular journal, called Yerakki, (Progress, a political journal 
devoting a special page to women), which was published in 1868 and suggested that 
education would help women to transform them into useful human beings. They also 
demanded more equality in the public sphere and criticized veiling, segregation and 
polygamy. The prominent woman essayist Fatma Aliye Hanim wrote a polemical essay said 
that polygamy was an Arab custom that had been adopted in the course of the centuries. The 
real rise of the women voices with the support of the state elites was in the Second 
Constitutional period (1908-1919) ushered in by the Young Turk Revolution. The Committee 
for  Union  and  Progress  came  to  power  after  the  overthrow  of  Abdülhamit  and declared their 
reforms for the nationalization project. They announced the period as time for freedom. 
However, the freedom, they argued, turned out to be only freedom for men; the reformists 
forgot about women once they obtained state power. Again, however, the liberation of women 
is used synonymously with progress and is linked closely to education. Emine Saniye, Fatma 
Aliye’s   sister, argues in 1910 that progress can only be obtained through the education of 
women and that it is up to women to undertake   women’s   education   (Terakkiyat-i 
nisvaniyye’yi   kimoen   bekleyelim?). A woman (Ismet Hakki) writing in Mehasin (Things 
Beautiful) in 1909 takes the argument even further by stating that rights can only be obtained 
by fighting (Carpismak Intiyari), and that it would be easier to safeguard rights for which a 
struggle had been waged (Sirman, 1988).  There was a marked drive to increase the number of 
schools for girls. Trade schools for girls were increased and reformed. Several day and 
evening courses in cooking,   sewing   and   child   care  were   opened.   The   first   girls'   lycée  was  
opened in 1911. Courses for nurses were started in 1913 and the number of scientifically 
trained nurses and midwives increased. Girls were admitted to secretarial and commercial 
courses. Women began to be active in exhibitions, ceremonies and philanthropic societies, 
especially in the Red Crescent Society founded in 1907. They began to appear here and there, 
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working in family stores and other small businesses. Thousands of women were employed in 
industry during World War I; these were mainly in the textile factories, and in the tobacco 
processing plants from which most of the men had been taken into military service. There was 
a purposeful drive to increase the number of women primary school teachers; special training 
courses were opened for them (Berkes, 1998). 
Thus,  various  vocational  schools,  secondary  schools,  as  well  as  a  Women’s  University  were  
established to train well-to-do urban women as schoolteachers and nurses. A few years later, 
when the Balkan war and the First World War broke out, these women actively participated in 
the war effort by raising funds, organizing supplies, tending the wounded and so on. The 
educational reforms of the Tanzimat did not only create the educated bourgeois woman. 
Elementary education in the Islamic schools and the widespread apprenticeship system that 
taught these women basic household skills laid the basis for the creation of a female 
proletariat (Isin, 1988).  
In Istanbul at least, the increased participation of women in work outside the home created 
problems for Islamic ideals of segregation. In 1916, the Islamic Organization for the 
Employment of Women was founded with the expressed aim of teaching women to earn their 
living  by  working  ‘honorably’.  This  organization provided women with room and board and 
allowed them to live a secluded life by taking upon itself the transportation of the resident 
women to and from work (Toprak, 1988). To conclude Ottoman women started leaving their 
houses long before Atatürk  “gave”  their  rights.  They  were  important  actors  in  the  time  wars  
but also their intellectual existence went hand in hand with the Ottoman modernization from 
the mid 19th century. When the new republic counted them as citizens, they deserved this title 
due to their efforts and not because of a feminist state, which was concerned about them. 
Their contribution to women was symbolic and not in the context of liberation but rather in 
the context of national politics. However the legal regulations were ameliorated.  
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2. New Republic and New Identities 
Early  Republican  reforms  (adoption  of   the  Civil  Code  and  abolition  of  Shari’a  law  in  1926,  
women’s  suffrage  in  1934)  gave  Turkish  women  civil  and  political  rights  as  part  of  the  project  
to modernize the Turkish nation, as the status and roles of women were symbolic of Turkish 
modernity and progress (Berktay, 2003; Durakbasa,2009; Göle, 2011; Jayawardena,1986; 
Kadıoglu,1994;  Kandiyoti, 1991; Sirman,1988; Y.Arat, 1999; Z.Arat, 1999)  
Kadıoğlu  (1994)  claims  that  women  had been burdened with the difficult task of defining the 
boundaries between tradition and modernity since the initiation of modernization projects 
from above not only by the Ottoman bureaucrats at the turn of the nineteenth century but also 
in the early republican years. The Kemalist intelligentsia instigated a sharper turn toward 
modernization with the explicit goal of bringing Turkey to the level of contemporary 
civilization. The ensuing reforms constituted an onslaught on the existing cultural practices. 
Kadıoğlu   uses   the   term   hyperreality   for   the   constructed   identities   in   the  monoparty   period.  
Hyperreality is the term used by the Baudrillard, which refers to reality by proxy. According 
to   Kadıoğlu   the   symbols   of   Kemalism   outpaced   the   real   people.   The   people   of   the   new  
Republic became the signifiers and defenders of the system. They became hyper real, the 
symbols replaced the reality. There are several reasons for being the free advocate of the state. 
The victory of the liberation war was possessed by only one group, which was in favor of 
fundamental modernization. People felt thankful and followed the founder of the state. State 
had the legitimacy to use force, if it is necessary. The Republican state itself evolved into 
what   later   scholars   called   a   “feminist”   state,   a male-dominated   state   that   made   women’s  
equality in the public sphere a national policy. The new government radically changed laws, 
encouraged women to unveil, to enter universities and professions, become airplane pilots, 
and run for parliament—in many cases before other European societies did. However, these 
state reforms represented only the vision of a single charismatic leader, the founder of the 
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Republic, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, and the values and interests of a small group of urban, 
middleclass citizens. The Republican state determined the characteristics of the ideal woman 
and set up a monopolistic system to propagate this ideal in a population that held often quite 
different  values  and  perceptions  of  ideal  women’s  behavior (White, 2003). 
 Under  the  leadership  of  Mustafa  Kemal  Atatürk,  the  new  Turkish  state  essayed  the  wholesale  
reorientation of Turkish society away from the Ottoman–Islamic past towards Western-style 
modernization. While banning the Ottoman fez and replacing it with the brimmed hat for 
men, the Kemalist regime urged women to remove their veils, to adopt Western fashions, and 
to work alongside men for the development of the new nation (Secor, 2010).  
Despite the propagation of these nationalist messages, the reach of these reforms was not 
even,   and   for   the  most   part   changes   in  women’s   dress   (and   lives)   have   been   inconsistently  
realized across in urban areas by uncovering their heads and benefiting from educational 
opportunities. 
In 1927, women were allowed to work at state-run  institutions.  New  women’s  colleges  were  
opened   in   Istanbul   and   Ankara.   In   1928,   female   teachers’   colleges   opened   in   music   and  
physical culture specialties. The Kemalist reforms have actually opened the way for the 
Turkish woman to speedily penetrate nearly all domains of the Turkish public, political, and 
economic life. That, however, has been the case for mostly urban residents, particularly the 
metropolitan   area.   In   the   provinces   the  woman’s   situation   still   remained   very   distant   from  
freedom. Women in Anatolia were not yet aware of these rights awarded to them by the new 
political system of the country, for they were, first and foremost, illiterate. They knew of only 
one authority, the authority of man, who exploited them as free labor. First it was the father, 
then the husband, and then the brother, if the husband died. Generally speaking, in the Turkish 
Province, the laws of life were stronger than the official laws. Even today, in the actual reality 
of the Turkish provincial life, there are a lot of cases of polygamy and trade in girls. Perhaps, 
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for many decades to come the official legislature will not be able to prevail over the 
traditional approaches (Safarian, 2007). As Safarian points out very well, the effect of 
modernization was in the cities rather than the whole country. Kemalism dealt mostly with the 
ideology and its expansion, which delayed restructuring the country and making a   “real”  
change  in  women’s  life.   
White (2003) described the new life for women provided by the Republic as follows; she was 
expected to behave and dress in a way the state defined as a modern. Western manner. 
Women who felt that their religious beliefs required them to dress modestly and cover their 
heads, and women who kept to older customs—like sitting on cushions and eating at low trays 
instead of sitting on chairs at a table—were not accepted into this Republican sisterhood and 
were alternately reviled  as   the  uncivilized  primitive  or   romanticized  as   the  “noble”  peasant.  
Since  poverty  and  rural  origin  hindered  women  from  “obeying”  the  injunction  to  leave  their  
homes,  become  educated,  and  contribute  to  the  Republic’s  professional  life,  social  class  and  
urban/rural differences were, from the beginning, implicit in the differentiation of the 
Republican   woman   from   the   “reactionary”   woman.   The   ideal   Republican   woman   was   a  
“citizen  woman”, urban and urbane, socially progressive, but also uncomplaining and dutiful 
at home. Modernity, as defined by the Turkish state, included marriage and children as a 
national duty for women. Marriage was to be companionate, rather than contractual and 
segregated,  and  children  were   to  be  raised  “scientifically”  by  mothers  educated in the latest 
childrearing and household techniques from the West. Beyond that, state feminism did not 
concern itself with what happened behind the closed doors of the home. The welfare and 
duties of women were discussed almost exclusively as attributes of the national ideal. The 
Kemalist woman was the product of the Kemalist state rather than an emancipated feminist 
woman who believes in democracy.  
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2.1.Kemalist State  
The Kemalists were in a minority in the Grand National Assembly when the political struggle  
started  in  1923.  However,  the  leadership  of  Atatürk  and  the  prestige  he  enjoyed  as  the  hero  of  
the war of liberation gave the Kemalists a great advantage. He established the Republican 
People’s  Party   (CHP)  and  was  elected  as  party’s  president.  Meanwhile, elections were held 
and   Atatürk   was   elected   president.   He   appointed   Fethi   Okyar,   an   old   friend   and   political  
associate from CUP days, prime minister, replacing Rauf Orbay who was one of the leaders of 
the conservative opposition. On 3 March 1924, the Grand National Assembly deposed the 
caliph and banished all the opposition. The ideology of Kemalism was launched when the 
Third   Party   Congress   adopted   the   six   ‘fundamental   and   unchanging   principles’   of  
Republicanism, Nationalism, Populism, Statism, Secularism and Reformism. These principles 
became   the   six   arrows   of   the   Republican   Party,   the   symbol   on   the   party’s   emblem.   On   5  
February 1937 they were incorporated into the constitution so that the amended Article 2 
read: The Turkish State is Republican, Nationalist, Populist, Statist, Secularist and Reformist 
(Ahmad,  1999).  The  constitution  didn’t  embrace   the  whole  nation,   it   rather  established  as  a  
booklet of a political party. The six principles were very ambiguously defined, which gave the 
floor to Constitutional Court to move freely on its decisions. Kemalism resided on secularism 
and nationalism, while the identities were created. The Republic inherited a society of rich 
and diverse traditions and then added on an enormous social change which introduced new 
modes of social differentiation and stratification. The Republic, in its attempt to form a new 
political community based on universal citizenship, had to find viable alternatives for the 
basis of power and legitimacy to the powerful institutions of the Sultanate and Caliphate. The 
Anatolian people in the 1920s were an overwhelmingly rural population of illiterate peasants. 
Hence, Westernizing reforms and a populist discourse involving a good deal of peasantism 
went hand in hand. The people were to be educated to become free citizens whose primary 
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loyalty would be directed to the nation-state. The omnipotence of the nation vis a vis the 
individual citizen was overtly emphasized. Yet in real terms, this was far from being the case 
(due to the multitude of communities) (Ayata, 1993).  As Ayata states the Kemalist claim for 
the homogeneous Turkish nation with European cultural habits always have been far from 
being the reality. The reality appeared much more complex than one single society admiring 
and following the Kemalist reforms. However Kemalism was very influential within the state 
institutions and limited educated middle class. It followed the strong state tradition of 
Ottoman Empire, radical secularism as the distance from the Ottoman, Westernization against 
Islam, state feminism to have the women as the signifier of all this process hand in hand with 
military to protect the system.   
Sirman (1988) argues that linking of women and democracy was also part of the struggle 
against Islamic forces, a struggle in which  images of an essentially democratic and feminist 
Turkish   past   were   frequently   made   use   of.   The   most   prominent   phrase   “emancipated   but  
unliberated”  by  Kandiyoti  (1994)  was  said  to  define  women’s  incomplete  liberation  process.  
However  the  state’s campaign for the reforms attracted a lot of women and they enjoyed their 
rights with enthusiasm. They internalized the reforms and stood on the behalf of the state. The 
state played the role of the protector. The strong state tradition was a continuity from the 
Ottoman times as Bozdogan and Kasaba (1997) describe.  The newly founded republican state 
explicitly aimed at severing all ties with the Ottoman past, especially its Muslim institutional 
and legal framework, the strong state tradition continued to exert its presence during the 
process of modernization. It was the state elites who decided for the people, at times despite 
the people and defined the common good as Westernization and executed their decision with 
quite effective results. With the legitimacy that the strong state tradition gave them, they 
could resort to authoritarian measures to undertake their Westernizing reforms. They could 
thus institutionalize the republic, replace the religious legal framework with a secular one that 
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included the personal status code (and gave women equal rights to men in, for example, 
inheritance and divorce) and give suffrage to women. Although the strong state with its 
unitary transcendental concept of the common good could implement its Westernizing 
reforms, the practice of democracy could not be autocratically experienced. Republican 
secularism was suspicious of religion and demanded to be closely guarded. The reformist 
regime had alienated itself from the everyday life of the people. The balance between the 
individual and society has swung to the side of the Turkish Republic in 1923, priority given to 
the   “common   good”   as   defined   by   the   state   elite   stifled   the   claims   of   the   individual   (Arat,  
1999). In  the  realm  of  gender  relations,  the  Kemalist  “civilizing  project”  aimed  at ending the 
seclusion of women by redefining their role in the public realm. In doing so, the project 
created women of its own image, closely bound with the creation of a national state and 
Westernized society (Ayata, 1993). 
2.2.National and Secular State  
 In addition to the westernized society feature, the national state was built on the base of some 
myths from the distant past. As Arat (2000) states the founding fathers of the Republic 
exhibited   creativity   in   “imagining”   the   national   state   by   rejecting Islam, the traditional 
religion of the majority, and seeking to legitimize their project with a reference to the pre-
Islamic Turkish past. This period was idealized, if not invented, to legitimize the Western 
values of secularism, equality and nationalism that the Turkish project of modernity sought to 
adopt. “They  claimed  these  values  already  resided  in  Turkish  culture.  In  the  reinvention  oft  he  
national cultural history women were very important. The  Turkish   intellectual  Ziya  Gökalp,  
who provided the ideological base for Turkish reforms after 1923, argued that women had 
been considered equal to men among the pre-Islamic Turks in Central Asia, unlike during the 
Islamic-Ottoman period.  
According  to  Gökalp: 
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Old Turks were both democratic and feminist... In every business meeting woman and man 
had to be present together... For any verdict to be obeyed both hakan (male leader) and hatun 
(female leader) had to sign the decree... Women were not forced to cover up... A man could 
have only one wife... Women could become a ruler, a commander of a fort, a governor and an 
ambassador (Arat, 2000).  Tekeli  (1986)  argues  that  it  is  true  that  the  women’s  revolution  was  
a significant part of Kemalism.  
Our  [feminists’]  first  question,  however,  is  this:  Was  this  revolution  undertaken  for  women’s  
own rights or was it used in some manner for the other transformation, the transformation 
Kemalism aimed to accomplish at the level of state. I solemnly believe there was such an 
instrumentality.  Atatürk  was  a  soldier  and  an  excellent strategist. He was a person who could 
evaluate  what  women’s  rights  meant  in  the  context  of  the  transformation  of  the  state.  He  was  
a  Jacobin  and  he  made  use  of  women’s  rights  as  much  as  he  could(Tekeli, 1986).  
Under the Kemalist Republican regime,   opportunities   for   women’s   education   and  
professionalism expanded. The new regime replaced the Islamic civil code with a secular 
code adopted from the Swiss.  
Arat (1999) says that this code was a cornerstone in their project to ensure political victory 
over the Islamist opposition to the Kemalist modernists. Another crucial change was the 
suffrage   to  women  in  1934.     “Many  held   that  suffrage  was  good  for   the  country  and   it  was  
Turkish  tradition  to  engage  women  in  state  affairs.”  The  active Ottoman women who were in 
struggle for their rights were never mentioned.  
As Çakır   (2007) clearly points out these critical transformations in the emancipation of 
women took place under the strict discretion and monopoly of the Kemalist elites. Women 
were not allowed to organize themselves on their own or to lobby for their own rights. Even 
though women had been demanding civil and political rights for themselves since Ottoman 
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times  (without  much  success),  an  independent  women’s  movement  was  not  allowed  to  emerge  
during the Republican regime.  
Yaprak   Zihnioğlu’s   book (2003) on Nezihe Muhittin;  a leading feminist at the time, 
elaborates  her  initiative  for  a  Women’s  People’s  Party  in  1923, but was denied permission to 
open   it   to   prevent   her   party   from   competing   with   the   Republican   People’s   Party   that   the  
Kemalist elite had simultaneously   founded.   She   was   advised   instead   to   form   a   women’s  
union. This organization, which hosted the Congress of the International Federation of 
Women, was soon perceived as having too much of an independent voice in the public realm 
and was subsequently closed   in  1935,  due   to  pressures   from  Ankara  (Zihnioğlu,  2003).  The  
Kemalists allocated the whole public realm to the modernizing state and neither autonomous 
women’s   organizations   nor   other   similar   organizations   could   be   tolerated.   “The   women,  
satisfied with the  new  rights   they  had  been  bestowed,  acquiesced   (Arat,  2000).   In  Turkey’s  
jealously guarded public space, women were emancipated but only to the degree that the 
founding   fathers   saw   fit.   “This   jealousy   was   successfully   transformed   to   the   republican  
women to check what  fits  and  what  doesn’t  to  the  “precious”  public  space.     
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3. Conclusion 
 
The purpose of this paper is to make a multi-dimensional research on Kemalist woman to 
explain her contemporary reactions against pious woman particularly woman with headscarf. 
Kemalist  woman’s  subordination  will  for  Islam  and  its  symbols  were  born  with  the  new  
Republic.  After  the  National  Liberation  War,  Atatürk  and his supporters started a series of 
reforms and woman was appointed for the pioneering role in the westernization process and 
defending  role  for  afterwards.  The  founders  of  the  republic  led  by  Atatürk  discredited  and  
accused Ottoman Empire of being the reason of failure in the World War I due to its pre-
modern remainder features unlike the new republic. They abolished the sultanate and 
announced the secular state. The westernization equaled to modernization was not only a 
political project but also a cultural  one,  which  wanted  people’s  active  participation    such  as  
clothing in european style, attending mix-gendered events and learning new alphabet. The 
reforms addressed specially to the educated middle class, which already highly urbanized in 
the last quarter of 19th century. Rest of the country stayed excluded and remained indifferent 
to the reforms, except some shallow practices such as school ceremonies or national day 
celebrations. However, the state tried to control their daily life by sending republican teachers, 
opening nationalist institutions, obligatory five years of education and encouraging women to 
unveil. No critical approach was allowed and everybody was asked to love the republic and 
make the others love too. The modernization tried to implement a rapid change in the society 
rather than democratic practises. The elements of a constitutional parliament was there but the 
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implementation was overtaken by the state-government-party chain. This chain was naturally 
pointing  Atatürk  thought (Kemalism) since until 1950 Turkey was a mono-party state. There 
were several attempts to build an opposing party, but in most cases they were closed by the 
Constitutional Court due to their non-Kemalist attitude. The lucid duality in the society as the 
consequence of  authoritarian  modernization  didn’t  show  its  face  before  1980s.  The  
phenomenon of  emigration started in 1980s and soon after, the  excluded  ‘periphery’  found  its  
discourse in Political Islam and demanded its share. According to Kemalist women, losing 
republican values was the same with the losing their position in the society. They felt 
threatened and started organizations and fight against the  headscarf, which was accepted as 
the symbol of political Islam. This struggle was first fired in 1990s, subsequently in 1997 a 
soft coup took place and Kemalists found peace again after the members of the pro-Islamist 
party were prohibited for some years. The AKP was established by the progressive wing of 
this prohibited party. The fear reached the peak when it was the winner of the 2002 elections. 
In  2007  before  the  presidential  elections  Kemalist  stood  up  for  ‘their’  republic  once  again  to  
show their reaction against a First Lady with a headscarf . They were well organized in 
several big cities and the army was also on their behalf, which gave an anti-democratic feature 
to these protests from the beginning.  
This work claims that the rhetoric of Kemalist woman is and was based on militarist 
nationalism and authoritarian laicism which is a heritage from the Kemalist modernization 
project. Subsequently this heritage denied the Ottoman heritage and tried to create a one 
nation state from a multi-national empire. The dramatic division appeared between the ones 
who were in favor of Kemalism and the ones who were in favor of mild and slow changes. 
Ecevit (1970) claimed if one day the Kemalist intelligentsia had to make a choice between the 
principles  of  Atatürk  and  democracy,  there  were  the  ones  who  would  choose  the  principles  of  
Atatürk  and  believed  that  the  nation  wouldn’t  survive  without  them.  Ecevit’s  argument  
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summarizes the rhetoric of the Kemalist Woman. These women think claim their rights 
wouldn’t  be  protected  if  the  state  mechanisms  didn’t  control the Islamists. The rhetoric is state 
versus society and each power is in struggle with one another for influence over the state 
(Yazici, 2001).  A convergence of intellectual trends in the world and in Turkey over the past 
two  decades  have  led  to  a  widening  debate  on  various  institutions  and  aspects  of  “modernity”  
i.e. the nation state, centralized political structures, cultural uniformity, relations with 
minority groups and religion. In Turkey, Kemalism, a term often used in a generic sense to 
refer to a wide range of ideas and institutionalized forms of behaviour, has become a specific 
reference for critical viewpoints. One major aspect of Kemalism which is vigorously taken up 
in intellectual debates is its approach to the place of religion in society and its relation with 
other aspects of social and political life (Ayata, 1993). By systematically excluding Islam, 
Turkish modernization failed to direct indigenous culture into new channels so as to transform 
them into modern ones. Instead, with a single minded emphasis upon cultural homogeneity 
and uniformity, Turkish modernization attempted a total approach in importing and 
transplanting Western values and institutions. Thus the modernist attempt at civilizing could 
not successfully accommodate rising social groups and classes and fell short of providing 
them with new frameworks  for  social  emulation  (Göle,  1991).   
Arat (1999) thinks Kemalist women have the Kemalist heritage 'which has stood for and 
legitimized the statist, solidarist understanding of democracy where the ruling elite that rules 
for the people at times does so despite the people. Secularists declare that the Islamist women 
are the best victims of an obscurantist ideology and usually the enemy against whom they 
must   organize(Arat,   1999).   As   the   Founders   of   the   Republic   they   also   don’t   believe   an  
individual preference, their impression about the women with headscarf shaped itself 
accordingly.  The  pious  women  were  cheated.  They  can’t  choose  not  to  be  Kemalist  because  it  
is  the  best  way  for  a  modern  woman.  Women  should  be  grateful  to  Atatürk  for  their  liberty.  
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The untouchable  distance  was  noticed  when  Can  Dündar  was  gathering  material  for  his  film  
as Yazici (2001) conveys; he realized that all information relating to Ataturk had been 
covered, veiled. According   to   Dündar,   it   is   not   all   easy   to   try   to   reach   “the   Turks” recent 
history. Most of the social actors whose cultural productions are refer to in this paper label 
their work as a brave first step. The forces that are seen as hiding the truths of the past are 
referred  to  either  as  “official  history”  or  as  “they”.  These forces are left to remain ambiguous 
and undefined (although frequently blame is assigned to the educational system) and are used 
to  make   the   claim   that   the   actors'   “discovery”  of   the  past   is   a  heroic   struggle   against   these  
forces. 
Likewise Arat (1999), Yazıcı   (2001)  also   thinks   that      the   engagement  with   the  past   is   very  
much a phenomenon of the middle class, the urban and the educated. Yazici claims that they 
are engaged vastly with the past (especially the 90s) due to the Islamist movement as a major 
challenge. Their task of  “loving   the   republic”   and   the   goal   of   “making   the   youth   love   the  
Republic”  turned  into  a  real  struggle  as  they  lost  the  power  in  the  state  institutions.  The  fight  
for developing love for the Republic has been present at exactly the moment  when  the  “threats  
to   the   Republic”   have   been   really   felt,   which   turns   it   into   a   hegemonic   claim   as  
Cagatay(2009) defines for the Republican Protests. To conclude, this thesis suggests five 
significant determinations  enrolled in the Kemalist women reflex throughout the history.  
1) Turkish modernization project chose woman as the symbol to declare its independence 
from  the  past  regulations  (Arat,  1999,  Kadıoğlu,  1994).  Thus modern women were to display 
their modernity (and modesty) through their physical appearance. Beauty contests, which 
began to be held by Cumhuriyet (the unofficial spokespaper of the state) in 1929, also 
revealed the preoccupation  with this visibility (Olcay, 2009). 
2) Due to the desired distance from the Ottoman Empire, the whole heritage of modernization 
and women movements were ignored and the state elites of new republic acted as if they gave 
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the   rights   for   granted.   The   gratitude   to   Atatürk   and   the   republic   became   a   must   to   be  
enlightened woman (Çakır,  2007).   
3)Atatürk  wanted  to  replace  Islam  with  Kemalism.  This  new  religion  wanted  to  raise  national  
awareness. In order to be Kemalist, one should be also nationalist as it has been the fairest 
nation for women because of its egalitarian roots from the distant past. To enter the public 
sphere  several  women  didn’t  hesitate  to  be  as  it  was  regulated.  Nationalism  was  perceived  as  
a way to improve their condition (Jayawardena, 1986). 
4)Kemalist women were entitled to modernize the rest of the society by educating them. In 
this frame the most honourable profession is teacher, who would bring the reforms to the 
corners  of  the  country.  Açıkel(2002)  mentions  the  didactic  feature  of  Kemalism,which  bases  
on  the  social  engineering.  Kadıoğlu  (1994)  thinks  this  could be also colonia feminism, which 
doesn’t  accept  the  native  but  it  rather  has  the  tranforming  scope  for  the  “good”.   
5) With the rise of Political Islam in 1990s, Kemalist organised due to their awareness of the 
‘danger’.  They  didn’t  perceive  it  as  a  democratic development and another pattern of political 
engagement. In her claim the woman followed a militarist way and polarized the women on 
both sides.  
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